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WORKING DRAFT

REPORT TO THE DDCI

COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW
OF THE IHC-SPONSORED COMMUNITY
INFORMATION RETRIEVAL SYSTEM (CIRS) PLAN

Report of the DCI's Intelligence Information Handling Committee

Uses Management Coordination Group

Prepared by
The CIRS Management Coordination Group

78 July, 1985

18 July 1985




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
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I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW OF CIRS PLAN

BACKGROUND

1.1 In September 1982, the IHC unanimously agreed to adopt the Community Information Retrieval System (CIRS) plan as an IHC-sponsored effort and recommended that the plan be presented to the DDCI for approval. In December 1982 the CIRS plan was briefed to the DDCI. The DDCI concurred with the IHC's recommendation to proceed with the implementation of the plan, subject to annual reviews and modifications that may be required. The DDCI directed that the CIRS plan be briefed to the Heads of Agencies that would have a direct role in its implementation and that their views on CIRS be submitted to the DDCI in writing. DIRNSA, D/DIA, EXDIR/CIA, D/INR, and D/NPIC all concurred with the plan subject to continuous review by the IHC and with the understanding that specific attention be given to the security implications of implementing the CIRS plan.	25X1
1.2 The IHC reviewed and approved a proposed CIRS management coordination group as the mechanism for insuring that the implementation of the plan was carried out. IHC members identified representatives from their agencies to this group and tasked it to work on the detailed planning and identification of resources that would be required in order to implement the plan. FY85-FY90	25 X 1
resources totaling approximately have been identified for the CIRS effort in the CIAP, CCP, and GDIP. Resources totaling were allocated for CIRS in the NFIP budget for FY85. Two new IHC-sponsored working groups (i.e., computer security and common concept codes) and the existing IHC Telecommunications Subcommittee were tasked to address specific areas (highlighted in the September 1982 report of the IHC) that need resolution in order to fully implement the CIRS plan.	25X1 25X1
1.3 This comprehensive review of the CIRS plan was directed by the Chairman, IHC in order to focus the IHC on the problems and issues that have been encountered during the initial implementation efforts of the CIRS plan and to answer the following key questions:	
o Is the operational requirement upon which the CIRS plan was based still valid?	
o Are the technical and procedural assumptions upon which CIRS implementation was based still valid?	
o If the requirement for CIRS is still valid, what changes in design and planning need to be made to accommodate new realities?	25 X 1
1.4 This report summarizes the efforts of the IHC and its working groups and subcommittees that have been working to implement the CIRS plan. It highlights the efforts of the IHC regarding the implementation of the plan and recommends to the DDCI various IHC-approved alternatives and a recommended	
course of action for the CIRS effort.	25 X 1

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Appendix B

Excerpts from IHC Minutes of 30 November 1984

The next topic discussed was the Preliminary CIRS Security Plan. The chairman advised that comments on NSA's proposed revision to the plan were received from CIA and DIA. The chairman asked for general comments and recommendations about NSA's proposed revision. representing DIA, indicated that DIA's comments reflected DIA's concerns that the Preliminary CIRS Security Plan was based upon the DoD Computer Security Center's Evaluation Criteria (i.e., the orange book) which has not yet been finalized.	STAT
He noted that DIA feels DCID 1/16 serves as the basic reference for computer security in the Intelligence Community.	STAT
the CIA representative, said that CIA's basic position has not changed since CIA's initial comments were provided earlier in the year and that the publication of a preliminary security plan would be premature until	STAT
the whole problem of data sharing is resolved. He noted that CIA feels there should be a Community information sharing policy noted that the original CIRS implementation plan, agreed to by the IHC in September of 1982, was a statement of information sharing policy to which the agencies were	STAT
willing to agree and included security caveats as a condition for CIRS implementation. interjected that Phases I and II of the plan had	STAT
been agreed to by the DDCI and the Directors of NSA, DIA, INR, and EXDIR CIA, based on the resolution of potential security problems.	STAT
NSA's representative, stated that NSA's position had always been that there should be MOUs or LOAs between NSA and the producers of data	STAT
(i.e., State, CIA, and DIA) for Phase I of the CIRS effort; therefore, there was no need for a CIRS security plan for Phase I indicated that he felt former IHC representative from CIA, had agreed to MOUs or	STAT
LOAs for Phase I of CIRS. He also noted that CIA agreed to the CIRS implementation plan with the understanding that the plan be re-examined each year and that CIA not be committed to connecting to CIRS until security	STAT
problems were adequately resolvednoted that CIA could live with NSA's proposal of the CIRS security plan during Phase I as long as an MOU or	STAT
LOA is developed between NSA and CIA to ensure protection of the CIA data processed on the NSA system. He acknowledged that NSA's proposed revision of the Preliminary CIRS Security Plan has taken the meat out of the original idea	:
of having minimum security standards and that we might as well not have a CIRS security plan that is as weak as the NSA revision; however, he noted that to	
break the impasse on the CIRS security plan, Phase I of the effort should get underway based on MOUs or LOAs between NSA and the agencies/departments	
concerned.	STAT

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noted that NSA has developed the software which will allow its system to restrict access to State Department materials in accordance with a	STAT
LOA between State and NSA. He also noted that work is almost completed on software modifications necessary to automate CIA electricals which will be stored on the NSA system and that a draft MOU has been sent to CIA for review	STAT
and is being worked through the respective General Counsel offices at CIA and NSA further noted that the LOA between State and NSA, which had	STAT
been signed some time ago, was developed independent of the CIRS plan. Mr. questioned whether State's LOA was based on the development of the CIRS security plan. said that the LOA did not hinge on the CIRS security	STAT
plan and that all security issues between NSA and State had been settled.	STAT
then noted that the key question was, "Would each agency agree to store their data on the NSA computer under Phase I of the CIRS implementation plan based on MOUs or LOAs without the need for the minimum agreed upon	STAT
security criteria identified in the CIRS security plan?" stated that DIA was still divided on this issue and had not yet made a decision. The State Department representative noted that he was substituting for Bill Price and stated that he was not sure what State's position was on this issue. The CIA representative suggested that Phase I of the CIRS plan should be implemented without having a Preliminary CIRS Security Plan and that it should	STAT
be based on MOUs or LOAs.	STAT
then asked the IHC members why we had expended the effort to develop a CIRS security plan. (Chairman of the CIRS security	STAT
working group) reminded the IHC members that a tasking statement for the CIRS security working group had been developed in January 1983, passed out and briefed at the IHC off-site in March 1983 and had been agreed to by the full IHC, prior to the Community's security representatives to the group and a	STAT
contractor beginning the effort in the Fall of 1983. further noted that the DDCI, in his letter of 6 May 1983, had directed that security criteria be established for automated systems and networks processing intelligence information. He said that he felt the Preliminary CIRS Security Plan may still have some deficiencies, but that there was no question that the IHC had tasked the group to develop a security plan for CIRS. However, he also noted that since there was an impasse on the CIRS security plan, it appeared that the IHC was providing new direction to proceed with Phase I of CIRS based on the use of MOUs or LOAs. The members agreed. The DOE representative added that the development of the CIRS security plan was not a wasted effort, since we had gained some valuable insights into security	STAT
aspects which should be addressed in MOUs or LOAs.	STAT
added that future efforts on the CIRS security plan would	STAT
probably be delayed until after NSA gained experience with the automation of the data to be placed on the NSA systems. Questioned whether we could wait, since network security between the COINS and DODIIS networks was still an outstanding issue which needed to be addressed in sufficient time to	STAT
allow the two networks to become interoperable in 1986. (There was no further discussion or direction on this issue.)	STAT

concluded the discussion by saying that the IHC members had analyzed and studied the CIRS security plan in great depth and that today's discussion regarding NSA's amendments have taken the thrust out of what the original working group did. However, it was also apparent that, since no agreement could be reached on minimum security criteria, the original CIRS security plan would make a good base document for the working group to continue to review and revise as experience is gained in NSA's CIRS	STAT
activities.	STAT
In summary, the IHC representatives were in general agreement that a minimum set of CIRS security criteria need not be included in Phase I of the CIRS plan. They felt that existing security regulations, in addition to MOUs between NSA and other agencies, adequately served this purpose. Furthermore, they also agreed to continue to address the CIRS security issues and to use the original CIRS security plan (Preliminary CIRS Security Plan dated 16 May	
1984) as the basis for future efforts.	STAT

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APPENDIX C

COPIES OF INPUT PROVIDED BY AGENCY REPRESENTATIVES IN SUPPORT OF THE CIRS REVIEW EFFORT

- o Comments from COINS PMO
- o Comments from State/INR
- o Comments from NSA
- o Comments from NPIC
- o Comments from the Army Intelligence Agency (AIA)
- o Comments from DoE.
- o Comments from CIA
- o Comments from DIA SAFE Project Office

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